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SOME
LETTERS

FROM THE
Marshal Duke de BELLEISLE

TO THE
Marshal de CONTADES;

WITH
EXTRACTS from a few of
the Marshal de CONTADES'S LETTERS to
the Marshal Duke de BELLEISLE, in 1758.



L O N D O N :

Printed by E. OWEN and T. HARRISON in
Warwick Lane. 1759.

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FROM THE

Marshall Duke de Berwick

TO THE

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WITH

EXTRACTS from a few of

the Marshall de Contades' LETTERS to

the Marshall Duke de Berwick, in 1758.



L O N D O N :

Printed by R. Owen and T. Harrison in
Newgate Lane. 1759.



SOME
LETTERS

FROM THE
Marshal Duke DE BELLEISLE

TO THE
Marshal DE CONTADES,

In 1758.

Versailles, the 18th of October, 1758.



I AM to answer, Sir, the Letter you honoured me with of the 13th. You were informed of the Victory gained the 10th over the Prince d'Ysemburg and General Oberg: You have the best Share in it, and I very heartily and sincerely congratulate you again upon it. Your whole Conduct in sending that Succour, does you infinite Honour. Had the same been done last Year, you know, as well as any Man, all the Misfortunes which we and our Allies might have escaped. I perceive, from what the Prince of Soubise writes to me, how kindly he takes your

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Attention

Attention to his Concerns, for which he will make you all the Returns in his Power: He anticipated what you desired of him, having on the Day after the Action ordered Messieurs de *Chevert* and *Fitz James* to march to *Warbourg*, and having taken all the necessary Measures to supply them with Bread, not only for the eight Days you require, but also for a great Part of the Time which that Corps, and what you shall judge proper to join thereto, shall stay in the Bishoprick of *Paderborn*. On my Part, I had foreseen the Difficulties that might occur in bringing your Bread from *Dusseldorp*, whilst you were at that Distance: And I have taken all possible Precautions to compel them to send Flour from *Mentz* and *Hanau* to *Marburg* and *Cassel*. Therefore I hope, that as we all draw the same Way; and as M. *Peyre*, who is an intelligent Man, acts in Concert with M. de *Soubise's* Purveyors, the two Armies will want for nothing in this Respect.

I also perceive with the same Satisfaction, that you, M. de *Soubise*, and myself, have separately been of the same Opinion, not to think of following the Enemy into the Electorate of *Hanover*, but, on the contrary, to march towards the *Dymel*. I reckon that M. de *Soubise* need leave but a third Part, or, at most, half of his Army, to cover *Cassel* and its Communications, and may draw near you with the rest, in order to enable you, if possible, to oblige Prince *Ferdinand* to abandon the *Ems*; and, for this purpose, that M. de *Soubise* will execute whatever you may propose to him.

It remains now with you, Sir, to determine upon the Motions you are to make against Prince *Ferdinand*, in disposing of Prince de *Soubise's* Corps, with Regard to the Advantages or Inconveniencies that may result from prolonging more or less your Campaign. We are all of the same Opinion about the Necessity of preserving the King's Army, preferably to every Thing: To this End it must be put into Winter Quarters as soon as possible; but at the same Time all practicable Measures must be taken to secure its Tranquility there: We cannot doubt but that the Enemy, knowing our Situation, will leave no Stone unturned to disturb us in those Quarters. On this Head the King of
Prussia:

Prussia has solicited the king of *England* in the strongest Manner: Prince *Ferdinand* has Orders in Consequence: The only Remedy we can apply, in this Case, is, to deprive him of the Means and Possibility of executing this Project: And it is for this Reason that you have observed me so earnestly desirous, that Prince *Ferdinand* might be obliged to repass the *Wezer*, and hindered from keeping *Munster* and *Lipstadt* during the Winter, or at least be forced to subsist there upon nothing but Magazines drawn from the *Lower Wezer*, and that all the Forrage on the left Side of the River in the Bishoprick of *Paderborn*, from the *Upper Ems* and the *Lippe*, might be eat up either by his Troops or ours, whilst M. de *Soubise* should be consuming all that on the *Dymel*, the *Fulda*, and the *Verra*: And in the mean time, whatever may be found in the County of *Marck*, and in the County of *Waldeck*, should be carried off, and brought either to the *Rhine* and into the Quarters to be occupied by your Forces on the Right of that River, or upon the *Lahn*, in order to render absolutely desert, and void of all Subsistence, the whole Tract of the intermediate Country between the *Wezer* and the *Rhine*, the *Lippe* and *Cassel*, and from *Cassel* to *Marburgh*. If to gain this End, you think the Campaign must be protracted too long, and that the bad Consequences thereof might be too prejudicial to our ill-clothed Troops, Part of whom are over-fatigued, and many of them are but half recovered in the Hospitals; in such a Case, I think, we must not bring upon ourselves a certain Evil, in order to avoid one which is at least but doubtful. Therefore the King leaves you, Sir, quite at Liberty to prolong or shorten the Duration of the Campaign, according as your own Prudence and daily Incidents shall determine your Option, either by the Motions and Position of the Enemy, or from the greater or less Severity of the Season, Frost or Rains; or, in fine, by your having consumed, destroyed, or carried off the greatest Part of the Corn and Forrage of the Country which you shall abandon, and taken all the other Precautions which your Prudence and Foresight may suggest to you. All these Matters you will concert with M. de *Soubise*, to whom I write to the same Effect; for as I see but very little Probability of our being able to make Peace, we must

must even now employ ourselves in good Earnest about the most speedy and effectual Means to put our Troops again in a good Condition, that they may take the Field early next Year, and push on the War with Vigour. It therefore now remains with you, Sir, to direct your Views, Marches, and your Operations, in Concert with M. de *Soubise*, in the Manner you shall judge most proper. You know as much of the Matter as I do; so one cannot do better than rely entirely, on what you shall judge to be for the best. You'll be pleased to impart to me what you shall resolve upon, as early as you can, that I may, on my Part, give the Orders relative thereto, and accelerate, as far as depends on me, all the Succours you may want. I judge in a cursory Way, and from what I see in your last Letters, that you apprehend you ought not to exceed the 15th of *November*, on Account of the Distance of the Quarters which Part of your Troops are to occupy, which require 15, 20, or 25 Days March: Those of M. de *Soubise* have not indeed so long a Way to go, at least those that are to line the *Labn*; but those, that are to be quartered along the *Meyn*, or in the Electorates of *Triers* and *Mentz*, will be longer on the Route, especially if any of them are to go up the *Meyn* above *Aschaffenburg*. This will depend on the Events that may happen definitively in *Saxony*, on the Place where the Army of the Empire will fix themselves, and on the Situation in which the King of *Prussia* may be.

I shall send you by the first Courier, my final Observations on the general Plan which M. de *Monteynard* has sent me in your Name, for quartering the Troops of your Army during the Winter, that you may make your definitive Observations thereon, and take your Measures, and give your Orders accordingly.

I have mentioned to you M. de *Torcy's* Proposal to occupy, between the *Rbine*, the left Side of the *Roer*, and the Mountains of the Country of *Bergues*, going up towards *Cologne*, several little Towns, that might contain ten or twelve Battalions, who would be very well accommodated there, and able to re-assemble in 24 Hours. If, after a more exact Enquiry, which you may charge him to make himself, with
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some of your Aid Quarter-Masters, you should find this Establishment solid and practicable, my Advice would be to quarter all the *Saxon* Troops there; they would be then, as it were, all together, and more conveniently situated, than *Frenchmen* would find themselves there. 1st. Because they speak the same language. 2dly. Because this whole Canton of *Bergues* is *Lutheran*, and a Similitude of Religion will be preventive of many Difficulties. 3dly. That they are good Troops, and that their Commander, the Baron d'*Thern*, is a very good Officer, discreet and able, who will act in the greatest Concert, and with the *German* Subordination, under the Directions of the Lieutenant-General, to whom you shall entrust the Command of all that Part. 4thly. *That, in short, if there be any Losses, Fatigue, or Dangers to risk, it is better they should fall on the Foreign Troops than on the King's Forces.* I gladly impart this Idea to you before-hand, which I ought not to have treated of, but when I sent you the general Plan above-mentioned.

I must also tell you, without Loss of Time, that there is a Project formed at the *Hague* by the Princess Governante, to force the Republic to make War against us, by making the *English* and some *Hanoverian* Troops act again on the *Lower Rhine*, and enter the Territory of the Republic, in order to oblige us to do the same. I can explain all this to you but very imperfectly, and only that you may allot as much Infantry as possible in that Part of the Duchy of *Cleves*, and of the Country between the *Lower Rhine* and the *Lower Maese*. Here's enough To-day of this Matter, which I shall resume a few Days hence.

I see, Sir, by one Part of your Letter, that you say your Cavalry wants a great Number of Horses to remount it, and you mention again the Weakness of your Battalions. If it be so, 'tis a fresh Proof of false Musters; for by the very circumstantial List which the Chevalier de *Finnel* has sent me of the Strength of your Cavalry on the first of *October*, it wanted on the Whole, to be compleat, but 910 Men, and 1668 Horses; which would be but a very small Matter, if the List is exact.

I like-

I likewise see, by M. de *Cornillon's* List, that you had 59,900 effective Men in the Infantry, of which 43,341 are Effectives under Arms; and this, exclusive of the *Saxons* and Battalions of Militia. You see of what Consequence it is to put a speedy Stop, whatever it may cost, to this false Dealing and criminal Abuse: You yourself, Sir, have the chief Interest in it, that the King and the Public may not think you are at the Head of an Army of 70,000 Combatants, whilst you have not perhaps 50 or 55,000 effective Men. I cannot express how much I am vexed to see that the King is not obeyed in a Circumstance of this Kind; and that you, who command the Army, cannot exactly know what you have or have not there.

Since we are both of the same Mind, nothing presses at present as to the Works at *Ruremond* and *Guedres*. I reckon you have issued your Orders for carrying on the Works without Delay, and with all possible Vigour, at *Wezel*, *Dusseldorp*, and especially at *Duytz*, for the Reasons I have wrote to you, besides *Duisburgh* and *Keyserwerth*.

As the King causes *Te Deum* to be sung this Day at *Versailles*, his Intention is, that you cause the same to be done in your Army, and make the usual Rejoicings among all your Troops.

I have the Honour to be,

With the most sincere and inviolable Attachment,

SIR,

Your most humble and most obedient Servant,

The Marshal Duke de BELLEISLE.

Versailles, October 23, 1758.

I Answer, Sir, the Letter you have honoured me with from *Ham* the 17th, by which I see that Prince *Ferdinand* was at *Warendorff* and *Reda*, seeming to make some Motion on his Left. The King has perused with Pleasure M. de *Poyanne's* Expedition, and M. de *Groin's* smart Action:

Action: I am also very glad that you are satisfied with the *Sieur Dorigny*, whom I personally know.

You have done very well in ordering Correction to the Inhabitants of Wezel, by punishing at the same Time Them in their Purse, and the chief Magistrates by Imprisonment.

I perceive that your Communication with *Wezel* is restored by *Dorstein*, *Recklinghausen* and *Lucynen*.

I am very sorry, first, for the Mistake that has happened in regard to the March of *Messieurs de Chevert* and *Fitz-James*; secondly, that they did not set out from *Cassel* the 12th instead of the 14th; for two Days more or less are sometimes decisive. I shall not be easy till I hear that all have joined you, and that you are in a Condition to execute what you have planned.

The king has been much satisfied with the Prince of *Condé's* Alacrity.

I see, Sir, that you had sent Word to the Purveyor of Meat, to take his Measures for supplying the Troops therewith till the Beginning of the Month of *December*. You may also give him Notice, that upon the Representations I have made to his Majesty, he has been pleased to agree, that during the Winter, a Quarter of a Pound of Meat shall be given to all his Troops, with an Ounce of Rice, which, together with an Augmentation of the Ration of Bread, must needs be a plentiful Allowance both to Infantry and Cavalry. You'll be pleased to make the Troops observe, that this is an unprecedented Favour, as the Expence of it must come out of the King's Coffers, and that the Allowances made to the Troops when in a foreign Country, have always been defrayed by the Produce of the Contributions: But I have thought it would be more eligible to be at this extraordinary Charge, for the better feeding of the Soldiers, than for taking Care of them in the Hospitals.

It is right to transport to *Mentz* all the Artillery fished up at *Dusseldorp*, that is not fit for Service.

I perceive, with Concern, that the Opposition of the Regency of Dusseldorp continues, and even encreases. I am very sensible it is improper to proceed to Military Execution in the Country and on the Subjects of a Prince in Friendship

and Alliance with the King: Nevertheless, the Army must not be in Want; and after making many Compliments, it is but going one's own Way to work, and taking every thing that is necessary for us.

I see, Sir, that when you acquainted the Army it might be requisite for the King's Service, that it should remain in the Field the whole Month of November, the Proposal was received there with due Respect; but that you could not convince the Captains of Infantry and Cavalry upon their apprehension of losing Men and Horses. I afterwards wrote to you, in my Letter of the 18th, that every thing was submitted to your Prudence, and that the King left you absolutely Master to prolong or shorten the Duration of the Campaign, according as you should judge it most eligible.

I annex hereto the two Letters of Service for the Chevaliers de St. Simon and de l'Ems.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

Versailles, October 24, 1758.

AT last, Sir, I send you herewith the ultimate Plan for the Disposition of the Troops of your Army during the Winter, together with the Observations I have made on it from the different Eclaircissements I have been able to get. You will there find that I should be inclined to augment, if possible, your Infantry, to guard your Left on the *Lower Rhine* above *Wezel*, as there is most Danger in that Part, and by that Means diminish your Cavalry as much as you can: For the more I look into every thing relative to Forrage, the more apprehensive I grow of not being able to find a sufficient Quantity for the Horses of your Army, in the Quarters that must indispensably be occupied along the left Side of the *Rhine*, and between the *Rhine* and the *Maeſe*: For, as to the Right of the *Rhine*, I am persuaded that, excepting *Wezel*, where you must necessarily form a large Magazine, all the rest will have enough to live upon, especially if, as I hope, you approve of.

of my Proposal to place all the Saxon Troops behind the Roer, in the Dutchy of Bergues, with our light Troops : They will consume very little Forrage, and will bring in a good deal to the Magazines of Dusseldorp.

The Dutchy of Bergues has not at all been foraged, nor have any Troops been there during the whole Campaign. It must abound with Subsistence; and when we shall be on the Spot, and see with our own Eyes all that is in the Houses and Barns of the Towns and Villages, they will no longer be able to impose upon us. There is a great Number of Carriages in the Country to transport the Whole to Dusseldorp. You will be just over-against the County of Marcke, from whence you may also draw whatever is left in it, by Force and Military Execution. So that I depend much on this Resource. The Saxon Troops will find themselves very conveniently situated there, for all the Reasons I explain in the Memorial hereunto annexed; and I believe you will be very well satisfied with the Baron d'Ybern.

I plainly foresee that the Palatine Court will perhaps take it very ill that we should quarter the Saxons in the Dutchy of Bergues; for there is a Fund of Jealousy between the two Courts.

In general, the Palatine Ministry is very ill intentioned; and if Regard was paid to their Representations, we should put no Troops at all in the Dutchy of Bergues, nor in the Dutchy of Juliers. M. Gayot no doubt has communicated to you the negative Answer of that Regency and of Count Scheisberg: But being forced to receive some Troops, he would doubtless rather chuse to see Palatine Troops put into the Dutchy of Bergues and in Dusseldorp, or at least French Troops. This is a Dispute which you must not at all enter into; and if, when it shall come to the Point, any Representations or Complaints are made to you, you need only put off those Gentlemen, by desiring them to carry their Remonstrances to the Court, and always go on your own Way. It is sufficient that you give the severest Orders for the Observance of the strictest Discipline, and that not so much as a Farthing be exacted from any Body, under any Pretext whatever. You will certainly, Sir, be of Opinion with me, that if we should put the Palatine Troops where I destine the Saxons, 1. We could not de-

pend on the same Exactness and Activity in giving us an Account of the Forage, furnishing Carts and Waggon, and forming the Magazine of Dusseldorp: The Palatine Troops and their Commanders would never be at a Loss for Pretexts to refuse Obedience and conceal the Truth. 2. I don't believe they have any principal Officer on whom we may rely so well as upon the Baron d'Yhern. 3. I think the Saxons more nervous, if there should be Occasion for any Coup de Main. 4. They are more numerous by one Third. To the first Representations you are to answer, That the Eight Palatine Battalions have been carefully placed in the Dutchy of Juliers, which is equally their Country, and where they will be much more quiet; and this Mark of Attention must be represented to them as a Favour; and, in fine, you may add, that the Saxons are to be considered as the Regiment of Alsace, since they are entirely in the King's Pay, have taken the Oath to him, and for the Present have no other Master than the King. You will also enhance to the Comte de Lusace in particular, the Care I have taken to place his Troops in such good Quarters and so near, as to have no March to make, and to be at hand for refitting at Cologne and Dusseldorp, and near Germany for getting Recruits. I think you can do nothing better than to charge M. de Torcy to place, in Conjunction with the Baron d'Yhern, the Saxon Troops in the Quarters he has proposed; and perhaps it might be better still, that you should write to Torcy to go himself, even now, through all the Quarters, letting him know the Number of Battalions and of Light Troops you intend to put there: In this let him be assisted by one of your best Aid Quarter-Masters. I'll answer for him, he will perform this Commission very well: 'Tis his principal Talent. I made Use of him very successfully during the Years 1734 and 1735; and as he is at Cologne, he may have an Eye upon every Thing that may happen there in the Winter, and will be very punctual in giving you daily an Account of all Things, and will keep an exact Correspondence with the Baron d'Yhern, who is to be under his Direction: Nevertheless, if you judge it proper, an elder Lieutenant-General may be placed at Dusseldorp, to command the Whole; for M. de Bergeick has not Capacity enough for the chief Command; and, besides, the Baron d'Yhern, being a Lieutenant-General, could not be under his Orders.

Orders. *Torcy* will without Reluctance be subordinate to the Senior that you shall set over him; but he will acquit himself better than any Body else of all the Details, and provide for your Places and Magazines with more Skill and Order, and secure the Posts that require it; and it will always be in your Option, if the Enemy should come, and there should be a Necessity of acting, to send thither some one of the old Lieutenant-Generals whom you could best depend upon: This would be necessary in such a Case. I always think aloud with you, Sir; I tell you naturally what I would do: No Doubt but you really intend to put *M. de St. Germain* in some one of the Places near those Parts where something might happen.

Notwithstanding the bad Accidents occasioned by the Ice, which do not always happen, I think it is right to keep a Bridge standing at *Cologne*, and another at *Dusseldorp*.

You must also have some active, intelligent Person at *Newwiedt*, for all the Quarters you shall hold on the right Side of the *Rbine*, stretching up the River as far as *Coblentz*; for I think we may and ought to draw a good deal more Forrage from all that Part, in making Requisitions to all the Princes and Sovereigns whose small Territories are adjacent, as far as the Electorate of *Triers*. I look upon the Article of Subsistence as the most essential of all, next to the Safety of your Quarters; for I see that, by the Scarcity of Boats, the three Millions of Rations of Hay, which I send you from *Lorraine*, from *Alsace*, and the Bishopricks, by the *Moselle* and the *Rbine*, will not all reach you, whatever Diligence may be used, till the Month of *March* or *April*: Therefore all Means must be tried to supply this Want from all the Places I point out to you, that you may be able to wait the Arrival of what is sent from *France*; and I am persuaded, that in bestowing upon it all the Attention requisite, you will certainly succeed.

At the same Time I have been intent upon lessening the Consumption of your Cavalry; so which End you will see, by the annexed List, that I place you all at once 24 or 26 Squadrons in the Country of Liege. I am assured with Certainty, that there is where-withal in that Country to shelter and feed them well during six Months; and it will be my Business again to dispute with the
Regency.

Regency and States of the Country about the Payments, and all the other Complaints and Remonstrances that may be made on this Subject, as also about the Garrison of three or four Battalions which you are to put in the City. There you will likewise want a Lieutenant-General that has all the Qualifications requisite, with a few Major-Generals suitable to the Purpose. I have already plainly told you, that M. de *Lauragais* shall not be employed this Winter; you will therefore chuse one that you judge fittest from amongst the Seven or Eight you have proposed. I think *Dandelot* would be very fit for it; and as I apprehend that the Carbiniers cannot be better quartered than about *Tongres, St. Tron, &c.* because they will be at hand to receive the Horses and Recruits which I shall speedily forward to them; the King gives them 400 Horses, which will be delivered at *Valenciennes* the 15th of *November*; and they may receive them in the Bishoprick of *Liege* sometime in *December*, together with all the Recruits I send them from all the Regiments of Horse that are within the Kingdom. Why does not M. de *Poyanne* stay this Winter? I tell you again, Sir, I cannot put up with the Custom of seeing Men expect Favours, Promotions, Rewards and Indulgences, whilst they are not ready to do every Thing. M. de *Poyanne* is well enough used by the King to give himself up to the Service through the whole Course of the War: If you are of my Way of thinking, why should you not set him down in your List for Employment during the Winter? And in this Case you might charge him with the Command of all that is to be in the Country of *Liege*, both on the right and left of the *Maese* down to *Ruremonde*.

By a Plan which M. de *Soubise* has sent me, for the Disposition of his Troops during the Winter, I find he wants at least 46 Squadrons for the Safety of the Quarters he must occupy, the Right of which is a very open Country, and at the same Time abounding in Forrage: He has in all but 32 Squadrons; there is a Necessity for bringing back the Gerdarmerie to the *Lower Alsace*: He will then have but 24 Squadrons left, and consequently he wants at least 22. I have found that there would be a double Advantage in letting him have them, and even 24 from your Army: 1. Because you are not able to find them Subsis-

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tence. 2. You do not want them for any Motions against the Enemy that may become necessary in the Winter, which are not likely to happen; and the Remainder would be enough for your Purpose. 3. These 22 or 24 Squadrons which you would lend him for the Winter, will serve to secure his Quarters, and the two Armies make a common Cause of this Article. 4. *They will be well fed, and we shall not give much Money.* 5. In the Journey you will make hither this Winter, in order to form the Plan of your next Campaign, we shall perhaps find, that the greatest Efforts must be made on that right Side; in which Case, Sir, the Business will be committed to you. But to confine myself to the present Moment; I wrote Yesterday to M. de Soubise, that we could supply him with 22 or 24 Squadrons from your Army; that I was going to give you Notice of it, and that, in this Case, you must both consult together about the Number and the Choice of the Regiments, to the End that when your Army breaks up, you may send him the Number of Squadrons you shall have agreed upon, by the shortest Route, and the most convenient according to Circumstances; which will prevent very troublesome Marches and Counter-Marches, especially in this Season. *I imagine this Cavalry might pass through the County of Waldeck, and thereby so far contribute to eat it up.* This, Sir, is what I have thought I ought to do for the common Good, leaving you, however, at Liberty to make the proper Alterations upon the Whole, which hourly Incidents, that I cannot see from *Versailles*, may induce you to do. Consult with M. de Soubise on all this; and let each of you impart to me what you shall have agreed upon for the best. You will likewise, Sir, be pleased to communicate to M. Gayot every thing that may concern him in this Letter; for, as I am obliged to dictate myself whatever I send you and M. de Soubise, I assure you I have not a Moment to spare.

By disposing in this Manner Part of your Cavalry towards the *Labn* and the *Meyn*, and of the 24 or 26 Squadrons that are to be quartered in the Country of *Liege*, and occupying the Right Side of the *Rbine* with Abundance of Infantry, by the large Garrisons at *Cologne*, *Dussel-*
dorps.

derp, the Saxons, &c. I hope we shall have forrage enough to subsist upon till the Spring.

Your Garrison at *Wezel*, of 15 Battalions and 6 Squadrons, forms a respectable Head, and that is the most difficult Magazine, but at the same Time the most necessary, and the soonest wanted. It lies on *M. Gayot*, under your Direction, to set himself about it with all his wonted Activity. I wish I could do better towards it: I assure you I am not sparing of my Pains, and am very intent upon it.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

P. S. That I may not delay the Courier, I will not write to *M. Gayot* till this Night, when I shall answer your Letter of the 19th, which is this Moment come to Hand.

Verfailles, Nov. 19, 1758.

WHAT I principally apprehended, Sir, is come to pass: I mean about the Dutchy of *Limburgh*. You will find in two of the Lists I have sent to you, that I proposed nothing but Infantry for the Dutchy of *Limburgh*, and I should have rather chose to put as many as 28 Squadrons in the Country of *Liege*. They would have been as well lodged and fed there; and I think it will yet be right to quarter no Infantry at *Liege*, and to put there four Squadrons more. I well foresee that the States of *Liege* will clamour and complain; but it will be more easy to appease them than *M. de Cobentzel*, who is a Man full of Difficulties and Vanity. (*berissé de Difficultés & de Vanité*) And I think we ought not, for a Matter of so little Consequence, to have a serious Squabble with the Court of Vienna. I must beg you then, Sir, (if it be not yet too late) to march the Regiments of *Orleans* and *Chartres* into the Suburbs of *Liege*, and to send the Regiment of *Orleans* Infantry to *Limburgh*: This will cost the Country of *Liege* daily six or seven hundred Rations of Forrage more. I am going to write to *M. Durand d'Aubigny* about it. Care must be taken that the Regiments to be quartered in the Suburbs of *Liege*, on the Right and Left of the *Mæse*, have a Guard of Foot Soldiers commanded by an Officer at each of the two Gates of the City

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of Liege: For I have agreed on the one hand with M. Durand d'Aubigny, and on the other with the Baron Van Eyck, Minister of the Cardinal of Bavaria, that if we had not a Garrison in the City, we should still remain Masters of the Gates, for a free Communication with the King's Troops, without depending on any body whatever. I observe to you, that one must avoid letting it be known at Liege, that the 4 Squadrons come there through the Refusal of the Austrian General Officers; this would occasion Jealousy, and produce a Volume of Writings and Complaints, which must be avoided. I am going to write in Consequence to M. de Lesseps at Brussels, and to M. Stahremberg at Paris. I blame myself very much, when you sent me the last State of the Quarters, and I found therein the 4 Squadrons in the Country of Limburgh, instead of the Battalions I had intended for it, that I did not then make the Observation to you about it. In persfying, I did hope they would be more reasonable at Brussels: This will serve me as a Lesson for the future.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

Versailles, Nov. 30, 1758.

I Have received, Sir, the Letter you have honoured me with of the 23d, by which I see you were then upon your Tour.

You were waiting for an Answer concerning the Determination of the Regency of Liege, on the Augmentation of the four Squadrons. You must have since received two contradictory Letters from me upon to this Affair. I hope you are come to a Resolution, in order to make all Parties easy, to send us back the Regiment of Chartres, and any one of those in the Country that is in the worst Condition: I will send you two complete instead of them, or the very same, if you like it better, in case they can be refitted and recruited in Time.

I reckon that the two Battalions of Engbien have entered Coblenz. I have dropped the Matter concerning Royal Lorrain and Royal Barrois: By what you tell me of them, you make me no great Present, nor will

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you

you much regret them, as you have the two Battalions of *Rouergue* in their Room.

I am willing to hope the Castle of Rhinfels will make no Defence, when you declare to the Landgrave, that if he puts us to the Trouble of besieging it in Form, it shall be blown up and levelled to the Ground; whereas, if he pleases to deliver it up to us, the King will restore it to him in the same Condition at the End of the War.

Whenever you think proper, you will make Use of the Bridge which I reckon to send you at *Coblentz* next Month, to supply the Place of the Bridge you have given up to *M. de Soubise*: I have also ordered one to be got ready at *Metz*, and another at *Strasbourg*. It is always right to have Resources of this Kind quite ready at Hand.

The Volunteers of *Clermont* are on the March, and will arrive at *Dusseldorp* on the Day appointed. The *Liegeois* Volunteers of *Halle* still wanted some Horses; therefore will set out a Fortnight later. I shall spare no Pains nor Application, in order to procure for the Royal Legion and all the Light Troops, whatever is necessary to complete them. *M. de Chabo* seems to me to have taken his Course with a better Grace than *M. de Turpin*; but I am persuaded *M. de St. Germain* will place them in such a Manner, as not to expose them to any bad Accidents, and that the Whole will take the Field in good Condition next Spring.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

Versailles, December 8, 1758.

I Have just now received, Sir, the two Letters of the 3d which you have honoured with from *Dusseldorp*, whereby I see a Continuation of the Measures you have taken for the Safety of the Troops settled at *Keyserwerth*, and others on the right Side of the *Rhine*. As you will

not go yourself to visit the Quarters occupied by our Light Troops, and do well not to go, I doubt not but you have charged M. de St. Germain to visit them; for I perceive that Messieurs de Chabo and Turpin are uniform in their Accounts to me, that their Quarters are by no means safe; and that, by the Nature of the Country, they may be beat up and cut off, without its being in their Power to hinder or even guard against such Events. M. de St. Germain is very capable of deciding this Point. It would be vexatious if any Accident of this Kind should happen to us, whilst I am very intent upon Ways and Means to refit and complete those Troops, of which we shall stand in great Need next Campaign.

*I am extremely glad that you have had the Conversation, of which you are pleased to give me a Detail, with the Regency of Dusseldorp, and that the Count de Schaiffberg was the first to propose it. You have managed perfectly well, and I wrote to you in my Letter of * Yesterday, to talk to them in a very firm style, because it perfectly agrees with the Terms of Regard and Respect due to the Elector Palatine: But, as Necessity has no Law, it was very right to tell them, that you would take what they would not furnish with a good Grace; and it must really be done, and they must be obliged, particularly to collect Forrage from the Upper Dutchy of Bergues, where there must certainly be a great deal. They must command all the Carriages of the Country, in order to make two or three great Convoys, which will be escorted by our Light Troops and Grenadiers. M. Groitz very well knows how to effect this whenever he pleases, and he must be made willing to do it; for it is certain, that when this shall be done, the Country of Bergues alone may supply us in Dusseldorp with upwards of three or four hundred thousand Rations, besides what our Light Troops may yet collect in the County of Marck from the Parts on the Right, which you have not been able to consume nor carry off.*

* See some Letters already published.

It is indeed my Intention to send you all the Recruits of your Army about the End of *January*. I shall send Inspectors to review them. They shall be well armed; and I will keep at Home none but such as may be too young, as I did at the Beginning of this Campaign. They have been exercised: The same is actually doing with all the Recruits that have been raised since the Month of *September*.

I am highly pleased with the good Account you gave me in your Letter of the Contractors of the Hospitals. I shall cause this Article of your Letter to be read to the Comptroller-General, who owes them above 1,500,000 Livres, which they can no longer do without.

I have the Honour to be, &c.





EXTRACTS

FROM SOME

LETTERS

OF THE

Marshal De CONTADES

TO THE

Marshal Duke de BELLEISLE.

In 1758.

Sept. 24.



De Bergeick writes to me from *Duffeldorp*, that the Regency of that City pay no Regard to any of his Requests, and namely, concerning the Forrage which the Intendant has demanded of the Country of *Bergues*, in order to form a Magazine at *Duffeldorp*. If you do not please to allow me to authorize *M. de Bergeick* to employ Force in this Case, but little Hay from that Country will be brought to *Duffeldorp*.

Or.

Oct. 17.

M De *Schaisberg* and the Regency of *Dusseldorp* are intolerably slow to furnish what is required of them: They promise every Thing, conclude nothing, and have much Ill-will. I write in a complaisant Strain, at other Times I menace, and all in vain: And at the same Time it seems to me very difficult to make Use of Military Execution, which, however, would be the only effectual Method.

At Bockum, Nov. 17.

YESTERDAY I received a Letter from the Chevalier d'*Aigremont*, who acquaints me that the Elector of *Triers* refuses to admit into the Citadel of *Coblentz*, and even into the City, the three Battalions destined thereto, which are on their March thither, and that the Elector has sent you a Courier about it. Should he persist in this Refusal, I should be at a Loss how to quarter the three Battalions. I send you the Copy of the letter I wrote Yesterday to the Chevalier d'*Aigremont*, and that which I write to M. de *Cobenzel*, who refuses to admit into the Country of *Limburgh* the four Squadrons appointed to go thither, with which I shall find myself embarrassed, if I should be obliged to alter their Destination, as I can only place them in the Countries of Princes in Alliance with the King, or in neutral Countries, to whom I shall be obliged to make new Requisitions; and these Princes will with Reason think it very extraordinary, that I should propose to lay a new Burthen on them, because the Territories of the Empress-Queen reject it. Yet it will be indispensably necessary to put these four Squadrons in the Country of *Liege*, if M. de *Stabremberg* persists in refusing them Admittance into the Country of *Limburgh*. As you have been pleased to approve of the last Plan of Quarters I have had the Honour to send you, in which the Country of *Limburgh* is included for four Squadrons, and the Town

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and Citadel of *Coblentz* for three Battalions, I did not imagine there could be any Objections to it, and I still hope you will be able to remove them.

At Cleves, Nov. 23.

I Received this Night the two Dispatches you did me the Honour to write to me the 19th. I find therein that M. de *Cobenzel*, authorized by M. de *Stabremberg*, will not have any Cavalry in the Country of *Limburgh*. I did not flatter myself that the Letter I wrote to M. de *Cobenzel* would make him alter his Mind in this Matter. I have charged M. de *Gayot* to make a new Requisition to the Country of *Liege*, for receiving there four Squadrons more. I don't believe the Regency of *Liege* have yet answered M. de *Gayot* on this Head.

At Geck, Nov. 26.

TO M. *Gayot's* new Requisition for the four Squadrons, the Regency of *Liege* have made Answer, that it is impossible for them to receive them in their Country. As I am persuaded they will not persist in this Way of thinking, and besides, that you would have Representations yet much stronger and more perplexing, should I put these four Squadrons into the Countries dependant on the Elector Palatine or the Elector of *Cologne*, I have resolved to march them to *Liege*, giving previous Notice thereof to M. *Dandelot* and M. d'*Aubigny*, that they may by Dint of Persuasion determine the Regency to receive them, and to furnish them with Forrage: and I hope they will not refuse it.

Wezel,

Wezel, Nov. 29.

THE Elector of *Triers* has sent me the same Gentleman that came hither some Time ago, to inform me, that his Master had sent you a second Courier, by which he desires that no *French* Troops be put this Winter in the City of *Coblentz*. I don't yet know what Effect the last Letter, which the Chevalier d'*Agremont* desired me to write to him, may have had. At all Events I have sent orders to the three Battalions to canton in Villages near *Coblentz*, till it be decided whether they shall enter the City.

Yesterday I received a Letter from M. de *Cobenzel*, who tells me, that he shall take Orders from Prince *Charles* about receiving in the Dutchy of *Limburgh* the two Battalions destined thereto: It will be the Regiment of *Condé*: That of *Orleans*, which is settled at *Liege*, is to remain there. At the Close of M. de *Cobenzel*'s Letter, he says that, as soon as he shall hear of the Arrival of those two Battalions in *Limburgh*, he will send Orders for finding them Lodging, Fire, and Candle: He makes no Mention of Forrage; and I am inclined to believe he does not intend to furnish any. One cannot say, that this Minister is easy to deal with upon Business.

Moeurs, Dec. 1.

Hitherto I have seen no Quarters but in Enemy's Countries. I have had Complaints that our Soldiers have not all the Necessaries that are ordered. Being able to command without Controul, I have explained my Intentions so seriously to the Regiments and the Burgo-Masters, concerning what the Troops ought to be supplied with, and that I would not suffer any Burgher to have a Bed under him, till our Soldiers were first served. This has had the Effect that I could expect from it in the Country of *Cleves*: It will be the same in this Country, and the Troops will be well provided for. But I shall meet with

with more Difficulty in the Countries of *Juliers* and *Cologne*: The Regencies of those Countries are continually complaining, and stand out against every Demand. I shall use them with the Politeness requisite, but at the same Time behave with the necessary Firmness. It would be unreasonable to let the King's Troops, who go into their Quarters with very few Sick, suffer during the Winter; and I shall certainly omit nothing that may conduce to their Preservation.

Dusseldorp, Dec. 3.

ON my Arrival here Yesterday I had a Conversation with M. de *Schasberg*, about the Dilatoriness of the Regency of *Dusseldorp* to furnish the King's Troops with what they want for their Winter Quarters. After many Representations and Lamentations on the present Condition of the Elector *Palatine's* Subjects, and assuring me that he would do all that lay in his Power, as he had already told me in several Letters, to the End that the Troops destined to winter in the Countries of *Bergues* and *Juliers* should not be in Want, he confessed that his Authority was very limited, and that he often met with Opposition from M. *Robertz*, Vice-Chancellor, and still more from M. *Greet*, Privy-Counsellor, who, upon this Article, had the Confidence of his Court: That he desired I would talk to these two Gentlemen in his Presence, and explain my Intentions to all three at once. They all three came to me this Morning: I had appointed M. de *St. Germain* and the Intendant to attend me at the same Time. After much Altercation, M. *Greet* being always the Speaker on the other Side, and treating, with a great deal of Sense and Knowledge, of the Business in Question, I concluded with saying, that it was impossible for me to take a Position different from that which I had taken: That it was necessary I should remain in it, that I might be in a Condition to act vigorously in the Spring: That the King and his Allies were equally interested in it: That I knew, from the Enquiries that I had caused to be made in the

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Country

Country of *Juliers*, that there was Forrage enough for the Horses of the Inhabitants, and for the Subsistence of those belonging to the Troops that were to winter there; that this Number of Troops had been much diminished, by twenty-two Squadrons and twelve *Saxon* Battalions that had been sent to *Soubise's* Army, four Squadrons that were going back to France, and 25 put into Winter Quarters in the Country of *Liege*: That I was very intent upon behaving towards the Elector *Palatine* with all the Respect that is due to him, paying much Regard to his Ministers, and sparing the People as much as possible; but that the Troops entrusted to my Command, should not be famished; and that, if they would not cause the Troops to be furnished with what they wanted, I would order it to be taken; which would be attended with much Disorder, and a greater Consumption, in Spight of any Precautions I might take to prevent it: That I was very sensible some Bailiwicks could furnish more than others, and it was their Business to make this Repartition; that I saw no other Means of doing it in an orderly and equitable Manner, than to enquire what the Winter Consumption might amount to, at the same Time make round Allowances, and inform the Burgo-Masters or Bailiffs what Troops they were to supply; give them Orders in Consequence, give me Copies thereof, that I might tell the Commandants of the Troops what Bailiwicks they were to apply to for the Forrage they wanted. After behaving with all the Resolution I thought necessary, I spoke in a complaisant Strain to *M. Greet*: He confessed I was in the Right, and that he was going to set about the Business with *M. Gayot*, who has just given me an Account of what he has done with him this Afternoon on this Head. He found him more tractable than he expected. *M. Greet* told him, that to make a solid Arrangement, such as would be proper in the Case, he wanted an Order from his Court; that, in the first Place, the Troops must not be in Want; that he was going to provide for them, and that he hoped I would be satisfied: That in order to make sure of this Subsistence for the whole Winter, he thought an Impost must be laid on Forrage through

through the whole Country of *Juliers* for the Quantity we stood in Need of; and that it was on this last Article he wanted an Order, or at least Permission, from his Court.

Being agreed about what was to be done with regard to the Country of *Juliers*, I proceeded to speak of the Country of *Bergues*, and said, That in order to be easy about the Military Operations, I must have considerable Magazines at *Wezel* and *Duffeldorp*, that I might be able to re-assemble the Army and subsist it in a Body: that to attain this End, I must not subsist the Troops in Garrison at *Duffeldorp* on the Magazine forming there, with the Hay that was coming from *France*: That the Country of *Bergues* ought to furnish Subsistence enough exclusive of that of the Light Troops placed there; that I would draw from the County of *Marck* as much as possible, but at the same Time would draw some from the Country of *Bergues*; that the Light Troops were destined to favour the transporting thereof; that I had ordered M. de *St. Germain* to omit nothing that should be necessary for executing this Arrangement; and that I doubted not of their furnishing the Carriages we should want for this Purpose: That it might be of much Advantage to the People that the Forrage which they did not want for their own Horses, should be laid up at *Duffeldorp*; that it would be safer there, not being exposed to be carried off by the Enemy; and that we should punctually give Receipts for it. These Gentlemen did not oppose this Arrangement: They even seem to approve of it; but I don't flatter myself that all Difficulties are removed. If they make fresh Objections, I will do my best to get over them.

Crevelt, Dec. 14.

M. *Gayot* has told me, that, though M. de *Cobenzel* said he had ordered the two Battalions of *Condé* in the Country of *Limburgh* to be furnished with Forrage only provisionally, it was impossible for him, M. *Gayot*, to provide for that Supply, and to charge a Con-

tractor therewith, who would begin by demanding Money, and that he has none to give him ; therefore the Country of *Limburg* must find the Forrage : That he has ordered the Commissary at War, appointed over these two Battalions, to take great Care that the Receipts be punctually given ; but that if the Bailifs boggle at furnishing Forrage, he is to make Use of soft Terms as far as he can, and conclude with giving them to understand, that if they do not furnish it, the Horses of these Troops must not starve, and that we shall take what is necessary for their Subsistence. I must again repeat it, it is a great Hardship to have a War to carry on in Friends Countries, and to be in Want of Money.

This moment, Sir, I receive the two Letters which you did me the Honour to write me the 7th and 8th. In the first I perceive with great Pleasure, that you approve of the firm Style I assumed with the Regency of *Dusseldorp*. I should be strongly tempted to behave in the same Manner with M. de *Cobenzel*, whose Consent to what we desire of him is hard to be obtained.

December 21.

THE Elector of *Triers's* Gentleman, who is here, came to tell me this Morning, that he had Orders from his Master to inform me he could not let the two Battalions of the Regiment of *Englien* enter the City of *Coblentz*, and that he had wrote the same to you : That moreover, his Country was not able to supply with Forrage the four Squadrons and two Battalions that are to winter in it ; that he gives me previous Notice thereof, that I may take Care to provide for their Subsistence, or else withdraw them ; that it was impossible for his Subjects, who have no more Forrage than what is necessary for their Horses and Cattle, to buy any for supplying the King's Troops, as they were not in a Condition to be at this Expence :

To

To which he added, that since the Beginning of this War, the Electorate of *Triers* had served for a Passage to all our Troops, and also to our Recruits that came from the *Upper Rhine* to join the Army; which was a considerable Burthen to the Country; and that hitherto nothing had been paid for what those Troops had been furnished with: That he intreated me to find an Expedient for preventing hereafter their passing through the Electorate of *Triers*: That this was possible, either by changing the Route, or embarking on the *Moselle* what Troops we should bring from *France*. All this the Gentleman delivered in a very embarrassed Manner, and with many Apologies for having Things to tell me which might not be agreeable to me.

I answered, that from all you had wrote to me about the Elector of *Triers*'s Way of thinking, I was astonished he should be against letting two Battalions enter the City of *Coblentz*: That I waited for your Orders concerning the Course you should direct me to take in this Matter. As to the Forrage, which, he said, would forthwith be no longer furnished to the four Squadrons and two Battalions destined to winter at *Coblentz* and Places adjacent, I was no Way uneasy about it; that I knew there was some in the Country; that I had ordered the Commandants to make the Troops observe the strictest Discipline, to give Receipts for every Thing they should be supplied with; but that on the very Day when Forrage should fail, they should take it wherever they could find any, continuing however, to give Receipts for what they should take. That as to the Passage of our Troops, which he complained of, I could make no Alteration; that I should continue to make Requisitions, as had been hitherto practised: That it was not practicable to relinquish the Use of the most direct Road; that with regard to his Proposal of making Embarkations on the *Moselle*, this Expedient had been used last Spring, and would probably be used again next Spring for the Infantry and the Recruits that should come from *France*. That to all the Representations he made me, to make our
Troops

Troops turn out of the Electorate of *Triers*, he ought to be sure that the *Prussians* would not march to the *Labn*. The Name of *Prussians*, who might march to the *Labn*, seemed to terrify him. He asked me whether I had any Account of this. I answered him in the Negative, but that it was possible, and it was this Possibility that had induced the King to put Troops in the Electorate of *Triers*, in order to cover and protect that Country.

I don't know whether we are bound in good Policy to have so much Attention to the Elector of *Triers*; but in a military Light, I think it is very necessary we should have Troops in the City of *Coblentz*, and still more so in the Citadel, which is on the right Side of the *Rhine*, in order to have a strong Hold in that Part, against any Incidents that may happen. I have ordered M. *Darvet*, in his Instructions, that, if he were obliged to retire from the County of *Niewwied*, which I did not imagine would be the Case, he should retreat to the Citadel of *Coblentz*, and afterwards into the Town, if he should be pressed by superior Forces: He can have no other Retreat. If this Case should happen, it would appear to me absolutely necessary to occupy that Citadel by fair Means or by Force. I concluded the Conversation with the Elector of *Triers's* Gentleman, with telling him, that I was going to send you an Account of all that he had said to me in his Master's Name; that as often as I should have Leisure to wait for your Answer, before coming to a Resolution, I would stay for your Orders: But, as it often happens in War, there are Cases where one must resolve immediately, that in these I would act in a military Way, without regarding any Representations, and do what to me should appear the best for the Common Cause.

I doubt not but M. d'*Affry* has imparted to you his Expectation, that the States General will allow the Exportation of what Forrage we may stand in need of.

December

December 22.

THE *Sieur Hugues*, Sir, arrived here this Morning, and delivered me a Letter from *M. d'Affry*, which confirms to me what he had told me, that the States General have granted Permission to the said *Hugues* to export from *Holland* the Million of Rations which he has engaged to furnish us with. *M. Gayot* will carry on this Affair, and give you an Account of it.

December 24.

M. *Gayot* reports to me, that *M. Kinkell*, an *Austrian* Commissary, who has hitherto been charged to receive the Revenues of the conquered Countries, refuses to part with what he has collected, without Orders from his Court, which he has not received. It is easy to prevent his receiving hereafter, but hard to oblige him, without forcible Means, to give us what is in his Chest.

This Moment I received a Letter *M. d'Aigremont*, which confirms what the Elector of *Triers's* Gentleman told me in his Master's Name, that he will not let the two Battalions of *Engbien* enter the City of *Co-blentz*. I had informed the Chevalier *d'Aigremont* of what the Gentleman of *Triers* told me, and at the same Time sent him the Copy of the Letter which I have had the Honour to write you on this Head.

F I N I S.